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The New Louisiana Employment Statutes: What Hath the
Legislature Wrought
Gerald J. "Jerry" Huffman, Jr.*
Louisiana, as with many southern states, was slow to enact employment
discrimination legislation. While Congress had provided protection against
racial, sexual, religious discrimination in 1964,' age discrimination in 1967,2
and disability discrimination in 1973,' our state's first enactment in this area was
to provide protection against age discrimination 4 in 1978.' Thereafter, the
legislature seemed in a "rush" to catch up with the rest of the country, enacting
statutes:
" prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped in 1980,6
" protecting those with the sickle cell trait in 1982,1
• prohibiting employment discrimination based upon race, religion,
color, sex or national origin in 1983,'
* providing protection for pregnant employees 9 and for affirmative
action programs in 1987,'o
. creating a "Louisiana Commission on Human Rights" empowered to
enforce new laws prohibiting discrimination in employment and public
accommodation on the basis of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age,
disability and national origin," and
* protecting those who smoke "off the job," in 1991.*2
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Partner at the law firm of Lemle & Kelleher, New Orleans, La.
I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2017 (1994).
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1985
& Supp. 1998).
3. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1985 & Supp. 1998).
4. La. R.S. 23:971-975 (1985), enacted in 1978 La. Acts No. 162 and amended by 1982 La.
Acts No. 561.
5. Louisiana did have some interesting statutes on the books before the 1970's however. In
1938, the legislature enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:961 prohibiting employers from
interfering in their employees' exercising political rights, which followed up on Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:962 (prohibition of employer control over employee's political opinions) which was
enacted in 1868.
6. La. R.S. 46:2251-2256 (1982), enacted in 1980 La. Acts No. 665.
7. La. R.S. 23:1001-1004 (1985), enacted in 1982 La. Acts No. 644.
8. La. R.S. 23:1006 (1985), enacted in 1983 La. Acts No. 709 and amended by 1984 La. Acts
No. 850.
9. La. R.S. 23:1008 (1997), enacted in 1987 La. Acts No. 900.
10. La. R.S. 23:1007 (1997), enacted in 1987 La. Acts No. 391.
II. La. R.S. 51:2231-2265 (1997), enacted in 1988 La. Acts No. 886 and amended by 1993
La. Acts No. 820.
12. La. R.S. 23:966 (1997), enacted in 1991 La. Acts No. 762.
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The 1983 general employment discrimination law was criticized quite frequently
for not providing members of protected groups with an adequate state means to
address their complaints. 3
The legislature attempted to address this concern in 1988 by creating the
Human Rights Commission, but neglected to revise and/or repeal the other
statutory provisions. This situation created mass confusion for the parties and
the courts in determining which statutes applied to a particular situation and
resolving the conflicts between the various provisions." Moreover, the
legislature has never, to this day, provided adequate funding for the Human
Rights Commission.'5
In 1997, the legislature took one more swipe, albeit a much larger one, to
alleviate these past concerns. Representatives Garey Forster, James Donelon and
Senator Ellington sponsored and stewarded the "Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law" through the legislature.' 6 Massive in scope, the new law
purports to eliminate confusion by wiping out nearly all previous employment
discrimination statutes in place of new Chapter 3-A of Title 23, consisting of
fifty-four (54) sections.
As with any new piece of legislation, however, the law creates as many new
questions as it answers. Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, the new law
is disappointing in several areas. Rather than creating a cohesive, logical
framework to insure equal opportunity in Louisiana's laws, the bill merely "cut
and paste" old provisions into one long chapter. For example, instead of
creating one central definition of "employer" for coverage under all of the laws,
specifically with respect to the number of employees required for coverage, the
new law merely re-states the old provisions for coverage under the listed types
of discrimination. The law also leaves unresolved the question of what to do
13. See Joel W. Friedman, Fair Employment Legislation in Louisiana: A Critique of the 1983
Act and a Proposed Substitute Statute, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 444 (1983).
14. See Ann Marie Curran LeBlanc, Louisiana's Fair Employment Statutes: A Cry for Clarity
Amid Expansive Federal Civil Rights Protection, 37 Loy. L. Rev. 313 (1991).
15. When the Commission was created, then Governor Buddy Roemer appointed members, but
never provided any funds. After the 1991 election, Governor Edwin Edwards transferred
$100,000.00 in "seed" money to the Commission from his contingency funds. Using these funds the
Commission was able to employ a "bare bones" staff sufficient to convince the national Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission that it could serve as a "deferral agency" under Section 706
of Title VII. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights. However, given the consistent failure
of the legislature to provide funding, and the Commission's inability to receive private donations
sufficient to allow it to employ an adequate staff, it is fair to say that it has had no meaningful
impact upon the employment discrimination landscape other than to increase to 300 days the time
in which an individual can file a charge under federal law to preserve his or her rights. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1996). For instance, unlike the situation present in federal law, a party seeking
to bring an action in state court has no obligation to file a charge with the Commission. See
Coutcher v. Louisiana Lottery Corp., 710 So. 2d 259 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1997). The new law retains
this anomaly with federal law.
16. 1997 La. Acts No. 1409.
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with our national embarrassment-the unfunded, unstaffed and apparently
unloved Louisiana Commission on Human Rights.
The legislature also enacted a few more bills in the 1997 session which will
impact the Louisiana workplace. First, the legislature dealt a blow to the "at will"
rule, codified in Civil Code Article 2747, by enacting new protection for
"whistleblowers" in the workplace. 17 In addition, the Louisiana Legislature
passed a law prohibiting municipalities from enacting a minimum wage. This was
done to avoid problems such as calculating the wages of an employee who
performs his duties in more than one parish where he might be subject to different
wages.' Other bills passed concerned a separated employee's right to vacation
pay 9 and the. an employer's new right to seek reimbursement of the costs of
medicaltesting of a new employee who resigns within ninety (90) days. 0
The majority of this paper will analyze the provisions of the new discrimina-
tion law, showing on a section-by-sectionbasis, the changes made to existing law.
In the second section, I will discuss the old issues resolved and left open by the
new law, as well as the new issues presented. Finally, in the third section, I will
propose some technical changes to the law which would aid both potential
claimants and defendants in efficiently resolving disputes. I will also briefly
discuss the other actions of the legislature affecting the Louisiana workplace.
I. THE LOUISIANA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
The authors of the new law obviously intended to clarify the organization
of Louisiana's employment discrimination statutes. Essentially, the enacted bill
is divided into five sections. Section I creates a new "Employment Discrimina-
tion Law" consisting of six (6) parts: general provisions, age, disability, race
(including color, religion, sex and national origin), pregnancy, and sickle cell
trait. Section 2 contains amendments to the Civil Rights Act for Handicapped
Persons, such that it conforms to the new law. Similarly, Section 3 amends the
Commission on Human Rights Act. Section 4 lists the deleted statutes and
Section 5 provides the effective date.
A. Section I
1. General Provisions
Part I contains general provisions, including the new grandiose title, i.e.
"Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law."" Section 302 contains defini-
17. 1997 La. Acts No. 1104.
18. 1997 La. Acts No. 317.
19. 1997 La. Acts No. 56.
20. 1997 La. Acts No. 1398.
21. La. R.S. 23:301 (1998).
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tions for general application of the terms "employee," "employment agency," 2
and "labor organization." Unfortunately, under the new law, an employee is
merely defined as an individual employed by an employer-and for that
definition, the lawyer will have to look for a different definition for every theory
of discrimination.
2. Age Discrimination
Section 3 11 describes the application of the age discrimination prohibition.
An "employer" is "an employer who employs twenty or more employees within
this state for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year."23 In addition, an employer also means "a
person, association, legal or commercial entity, or the state, its agencies, boards,
commissions, or political subdivisions receiving services from an employee and,
in return, giving compensation of any kind to an employee."24 This definition
is equivalent to the old definition of employer under prior law, but it leaves out
the coverage of ". . . any agent of such person, the state of Louisiana, or any
political subdivision thereof, but the term shall not include the United States or a
corporation wholly owned by the United States"" and adds the requirement that
services be received and compensation be paid.26 As is discussed more below,
this change will apparently resolve, once and for all, whether there can be
individual liability for age discrimination under Louisiana law. New to the
definition is an exclusion, for domestic servants and for relatives,27 previously
found only in the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights Act.s Finally,
coverage of the age discrimination prohibition is limited by the new law to persons
over forty years of age. 29 The old law followed the former federal limitation
applying the ADEA to those between forty and seventy years of age.30
Section 312 contains the basic prohibitions of age discrimination, and the
exceptions. There is no change from the prior law.3' The new law also makes
22. The definition of "employment agency" follows prior law at former Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:971(2).
23. La. R.S. 23:311(A) (1998).
24. La. R.S. 23:311(B) (1998).
25. Former La. R.S. 23:971(1) (1985).
26. The authors apparently tacked on the "receiving services... giving compensation" prong
of the definition from former Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006.
27. La. R.S. 23:311(D) (1988).
28. La. R.S. 51:2242(B) (1997).
29. La. R.S. 23:311 (C) (1988).
30. Former La. R.S. 23:972(0) (1985). The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621634 (1985 & Supp. 1998), originally contained the same
coverage limits but was amended in 1986 to provide coverage for all persons who are at least 40
years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. 1998).
31. Compare the provisions of La. R.S. 23:312(A)-(F) (1998) with former La. R.S. 23:972(A)-
(F) (1985) and with the provisions of the federal ADEA at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(f) (1985 & Supp.
1998).
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no changes to the notice posting requirements." Significant changes are found
in Section 313, however, which authorizes suits to redress violations of the age
discrimination prohibitions in state district courts only and also specifies that
relief includes back pay, reinstatement, reasonable attorneys fees and court
costs." Prior law authorized such suits in "any court of competent jurisdiction
for legal or equitable relief."3 As will be discussed below, it appears that the
legislature has done away with the front pay remedy. Finally, the new law also
does not appear to exempt its effect from state minimum age or mandatory
retirement laws."
3. Disability Discrimination
This section of the new law is based upon the old "Civil Rights Act for
Handicapped Persons" enacted by the legislature in 1980.36 Section 321 of the
Law defines application of the disability discrimination proscription to employers
with fifteen or more employees within Louisiana for each working day in each
or twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."
Employers are also limited to private entities and state agencies who "receive
services from an employee and, in return, [give] compensation of any kind to an
employee."38 Prior law stated that an employer included any person "who has
fifteen or more employees or a person who, as contractor or subcontractor, is
furnishing material or performing work for the state local or governmental entity
or agency or political entity of the state and includes an agent of such a per-
son."39 Again, the legislature appears to be ending the possibility of individual
liability under the disability discrimination laws. Finally, as in the case of age
discrimination, there is also a new exclusion for domestic servants and for
relatives.4"
Section 322 contains a laundry list of statutory definitions. For the terms
"adaptive devices," "disabled person," "discrimination," "impairment," "major
life activities," "otherwise qualified disabled person,"and "reasonable accommo-
dation," there is no change from the prior law.4' New definitions are provided
32. La. R.S. 23:314 (1998).
33. La. R.S. 23:313 (1998).
34. Former La. R.S. 23:973 (1985).
35. See former Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:975, which stated that "[njothing in this Part shall
repeal, invalidate, or preempt any minimum age of employment or mandatory retirement age
provided in any other statute or ordinance nor prohibit any age limitations permitted by federal law,
rule, or regulation for enrollment in any apprenticeship program."
36. 1980 La. Acts No. 665, codified at La. R.S. 46:2251-2256 (1982).
37. La. R.S. 321(A) (1998).
38. La. R.S. 321(B) (1998).
39. Former La. R.S. 46:2253(7) (1982).
40. La. R.S. 23:321(C) (1998).
41. Compare La. R.S. 23:322(1),(3),(4),(6),(7),(8),(9)(1998)with former La. R.S. 46:2253
(17), (1), (1I), (2), (3), (4Xa), (19) (1982). Of course, the word "handicapped" has been dropped
10371998]
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for "direct threat"42 and "essential functions." 3 "Essential function" under the
new law are defined as "the fundamental job duties of the employment position
the disabled person holds or desires.... [Such functions do] not include the
marginal functions of the position."" The latter differs markedly from the
definition in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,"1 which
specifies that "consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this
description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.""
Under the new state law, the employer is thus left without its federal "safe
harbor" and the courts (and juries) are given more freedom to decide what are
the "essential functions" of the job in question.
Section 323 outlines the types of discrimination prohibited. 7 With the
exception of the former law's application to educational facilities, real estate
transactions and state funded programs, the list of prohibited practices is identical
to that found in the Civil Rights for Handicapped Persons statute.'" In addition,
the new law does not exempt employees of religious or fraternal entities, even
when religion might be a bona fide occupational qualification for employment,
as did the former law.'9 As will be discussed below, however, there were
certain inconsistencies in the old law's provisions which have made their way
into the new law.
Section 324 is a new provision setting out defenses to an allegation of
disability discrimination.'* Apparently adopted verbatim from the ADA, ' this
provision first allows an employer to show that a selection criteria having a
disparate impact upon disabled individuals may be justified by business necessity,
if such necessity cannot be achieved by any available reasonable accommoda-
tion. 2 Second, an employer may defend its decision not to hire or retain a
disabled individual on the basis that his or her employment constitutes a "direct
threat" to himself or others. 3 As will be discussed below, the legislature's
in lieu of the more politically acceptable term "disabled."
42. La. R.S. 23:322(2) (1998). This definition is almost verbatim of that contained in the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1995).
43. La. R.S. 23:322(5) (1998). This definition is very similar to the discussion found in the
EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual at Section 2.3(a).
44. Id.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) (1995).
47. La. R.S. 23:323 (1998).
48. Compare La. R.S. 23:323(A), (B), (C), (D) (1998) with former La. R.S. 46:2254(A), (C),
(D), (E) (1982).
49. Former La. R.S. 46:2254(B) (1982).
50. La. IKS. 23:324 (1998).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b) (1995).
52. La. R.S. 23:324(A) (1998).
53. La. R.S. 23:324(B) (1998).
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failure to include certain defenses and exemptions contained in the ADA, 54 as
well as the former Louisiana Commission on Human Rights Act," might have
the unintended consequence of greatly expanding the new law's coverage and
effect.
Court actions to remedy violations of the disability discrimination provisions,
and the remedies available, are set out in Section 325.6 Small, but critical,
changes have been made to the prior law. First, the Civil Rights Act for
Handicapped Persons Act was one of the few previous pieces of civil rights
legislation which explicitly set forth a prescriptive period for the filing of an
action-one year from the alleged discriminatory act. 7 As will be discussed
below, the new provision is silent as to the appropriate prescriptive period-the
authors apparently content to allow the courts to continue to decide which
prescriptive period is applicable. Second, the old law provided remedies
including "all remedies available under the law ... including, but not limited to,
compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and any other relief deemed
appropriate." '' The new law authorizes remedies of "compensatory damages,
back pay, benefits, reinstatement, reasonable attorney fees and court costs."' 9
Again, it appears that the authors have removed the "front pay" remedy. Finally,
as will be discussed below, two unique provisions from the old law are
retained-that requiring a plaintiff to give thirty days' notice to the potential
defendant that a court action will be filed and a provision authorizing the trial
judge to award attorneys' fees and court costs, at his discretion, to a prevailing
defendant."
4. Discrimination Based on Race, Color, Religion, Sex or National
Origin
Part 4 of the new Discrimination Law is based on a combination of the 1983
Civil Rights Act6' and the 1989 Commission on Human Rights Act.62 Its
prohibitions against discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin apply to employers with over fifteen employees and who provide
compensation and receive services.63 Unlike other forms of discrimination, the
legislature has apparently chosen to exempt religious institutions from this
54. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113 (c) & (d), 12114, 12210, 12211 (1995).
55. See former La. R.S. 51:2232(!1 )(b) (1997).
56. La. R.S. 23:325 (1998).
57. Former La. R.S. 46:2256(A) (1982).
58. Former La. R.S. 46:2256(B) (1982).
59. La. R.S. 23:325(A) (1998).
60. La. R.S. 23:325(C), (B) (1998).
61. 1983 La. Acts No. 709, codified at former La. R.S. 23:1006 (1985).
62. 1988 La. Acts No. 886, codified at La. R.S. 51:2231-2265 (1997).
63. La. R.S. 23:331(A), (B) (1998). The Commission on Human Rights Act applied to "any
person employing eight or more persons within the state, or any person acting as an agent of an
employer directly or indirectly." Former La. R.S. 51:2232(4) (1997).
1998). 1039
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section's proscriptions." Finally, the exemption for domestic servants and
relatives is also provided for in this part.6'
Section 332 proscribes certain forms of "intentional" discrimination.66 The
traditional employer prohibitions against disparate treatment and disparate impact
discrimination track the language of Title VII.67  A similar provision is
applicable to the actions of employment agencies. 8 Labor organizations are
also prohibited from discriminating in their internal and external operations.69
Discrimination in apprenticeship programs and in employment advertising is also
prohibited.70 As in the prior law, discrimination by insurers against insurance
agents is also prohibited. 71 The protection from actions taken pursuant to an
affirmative action plan is also retained in the new law.72 Finally, the last
provision of Section 332 preserves the "bona fide occupational qualification"
defense for race, sex and national origin, exempts religious institutions, sets forth
the defenses to a charge of compensation discrimination and permits the use of
"professionally developed ability" tests.73
As in the case of the other types of discrimination causes of action discussed
above, the legislature has again narrowed the damages available to plaintiffs.
Under Section 333A, plaintiffs may seek as remedies "compensatory'damages,
back pay, benefits, reinstatement, reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs."74
Previously, a plaintiffjoining causes of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1983
and the Commission on Human Rights Act could also seek "general or special"
compensatory damages, "actual damages" and injunctive relief.7 ' Clearly,
"front pay" is to be disallowed. The legislature also retained the provision of the
64. La. R.S. 23:331(B) (1998). This provision was formerly in the Commission on Human
Rights Act at Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:2242(B).
65. La. R.S. 23:331(C) (1998).
66. La. R.S. 23:332 (1998). This apparent limitation to "intentional" discrimination is
meaningless since Section 332(A)(1)(b) tracks the language of Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994), which prohibits the
traditional "disparate impact" theory of discrimination. Under this theory, selection criteria which
are "fair in form" but discriminatory in operation are proscribed, unless justified by "business
necessity." Thus, "intent" is not required to establish a violation. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
67. La. R.S. 23:332(AXI) (a), (b) (1998). For the corresponding language in Title VII, refer
to supra note 66.
68. La. R.S. 23:332(A)(2) (1998), adopted from former La. R.S. 51:2244 (1997).
69. La. R.S. 23:332(A)(3) (1998).
70. La. R.S. 23:332(A)(4), (5) (1998) adopted from former La. R.S. 51:2245 (1997).
71. La. R.S. 23:332(B) (1998), adopted from former La. R.S. 23:1006(C) (1985).
72. La. R.S. 23:332(C) (1998), adopted from former La. R.S. 23:1006(C)(3) (1985),
51:2246(B) (1997). See also La. R.S. 23:334 (1998), formerly La. R.S. 23:1007 (1997).
73. La. R.S. 23:332(D) (1998). Subsections (3) and (4) were apparently derived from Section
703(h) of Title VII, at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
74. La. R.S. 23:333(A) (1998).
75. See former La. R.S. 23:1006(D) (1985), 51:2264 (1997).
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1983 law allowing judges to award attorneys' fees and costs to prevailing
defendants, when "frivolous claims" are brought. 6
In an unrelated act, the legislature amended former Section 23:1006 to
include a new subsection (D)." Now, predesignated as 23:333(C), the new
provision protects potential state plaintiffs from prescription while their case is
pending before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Louisiana
Commission on Human Rights-for up to eighteen months. 8 Query: does this
mean that actions for racial, sexual and religious discrimination are governed by
an eighteen month prescriptive period or by the one year prescriptive period that
courts have previously applied to Louisiana civil rights actions?7 9
S. Pregnancy, Childbirth and Related Medical Conditions
Louisiana's Pregnancy Discrimination Law,8" which created a four-month
floor on the amount of leave state employers are required to give employees for
pregnancy, was retained, on a word-for-word basis, in the new law.8" The
definition of "employer" under the law has been slightly changed by limiting it
to those who "receive services" and "give compensation," again apparently to
clarify that there can be no individual liability under the Act. 2 As will be
discussed below, the legislature missed an opportunity here to clarify some
inconsistencies within this law and to consider how this law should co-exist with
the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1992.83
6. Sickle Cell Trait
As in the case of pregnancy discrimination, the new law adopts, almost word
for word, the previous law with respect to discrimination based upon sickle cell
trait." The prohibition is again limited to employers with twenty or more
employees, but again such employers must "receive services ... and give
compensation," thus again preventing individual liability of supervisory or co-
76. La. R.S. 23:333(B) (1998).
77. 1997 La. Acts No. 1123.
78. La. R.S. 23:333(CX2) (1998).
79. See Jay v. International Salt Co., 868 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1989) (LADEA action is subject
to one-year prescriptive period of Louisiana Civil Code article 3492); Williams v. Conoco, Inc., 860
F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1988) (one-year period applicable to actions under Section 23:1006). One court
has recently held that even if an eighteen month prescriptive period applies to racial, sexual or
religious discrimination actions, age discrimination actions are still governed by the one year period.
Benton v. Zapata Protein, Inc., No.97-3330, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 756 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 1998)
(Carr, J.).
80. Former La. R.S. 23:1008 (1997).
81. La. R.S. 23:341, 342 (1998).
82. La. R.S. 23:341(B) (1998).
83. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. 1997).
84. La. R.S. 23:351 to 354 (1998), formerly La. R.S. 23:1001 to 1004 (1985).
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employees." Furthermore, the intent to deny any "front pay" relief can be
intimated from the changes in remedies from "legal or equitable relief' 6 to
"compensatory damages, back pay, benefits, reinstatement, reasonable attorneys'
fees and court costs. 8
7
B. Section 2-Revisions to Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Persons
At Section 2 of the Act, the legislature amended the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act for Handicapped Persons to remove all references to employment.88
Essentially, the law now only applies to educational facilities, real estate
transactions and state funded programs.
C. Section 3-Revisions to Commission on Human Rights Act
The Commission on Human Rights Act is similarly effected by the
new Employment Discrimination Law. As will be discussed below, the
Commission itself was left intact-as unsupported as ever. The new law
deletes many references to employment discrimination, as it did with the
Handicapped statute. 9 However, the new law specifically inserts a new
provision in the law stating that the Commission shall have enforcement
powers, including claim adjudication, over age, disability, race, sex,
religious, pregnancy and sickle cell trait discrimination.9 The power for
Parishes and Municipalities to create their own ordinances and agencies is
preserved at Section 51:2236.
85. La. R.S. 23:351(B)(1998).
86. Former La. R.S. 23:1003 (1985).
87. La. R.S. 23:353 (1998).
88. The changes are as follows: Section 46:2252 is amended to strike the word "employment"
from its second paragraph. Section 46:2253(2) is amended by striking the words "at the discretion.
of the employer." Section 46:2253(4)(a) is deleted. "Employment" is deleted from the title of
Section 46:2254. "In Employment" is deleted from Section 46:2254(A).
89. For example, somewhat nonsensically, the word "employment" is stripped from the first
few words stating the purpose of the Commission on Human Rights Act in Section 51:2231(A):
It is the purpose and intent of the Legislature by this enactment to provide for execution
within Louisiana of the policies embodied in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968
and 1972 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, and to
assure that Louisiana has appropriate legislation prohibiting discrimination in [employment
deleted] public accommodations sufficient to justify the deferral of cases by the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission....
but left the word in later:
.. to safeguard all individuals in the state from discrimination because of race, creed,
color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin in connection with employment ....
Section 51:2231(B) is changed by deleting the word "in connection with employment" and by
eliminating the age 70 cap.
90. La. R.S. 51:2231(C) (1997).
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D. Deleted Statutes and Effective Date
The new law deleted about seventeen provisions of the revised statutes9'
and affected many others. Governor Foster signed the bill on July 15, 1997 and
it went into effect on August 1, 1997. As the act contains no provision regarding
retro-active effect, it will be left to the courts to determine its effect on litigation
filed prior to August 1, 1997 or to litigation concerning events occurring before
August 1, 1997, but filed subsequently.
I. RESOLVED AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES
As set forth above, the new law clearly resolves various issues which have
engendered litigation in both state and federal courts in Louisiana. Individual
liability appears dead, whether it comes under the umbrella of "agency" or
"conspiracy" theory. The legislature also appeared to intend to do away with the
"front pay" remedy. But several other issues which could have been addressed,
such as retaliation, prescription, attorneys' fees and, perhaps most importantly,
the future of the Human Rights Commission, were left unresolved.
A. Resolved Issues
1. Individual Liability
Of all the issues under the various state employment discrimination laws, the
issue of whether an individual can be held responsible for his or her acts of
discrimination has been the most frequently litigated, but for mainly tactical, not
strategic, reasons. Frankly, there is a widely-shared perception among both the
plaintiff and management bars that certain state courts, particularly those in rural
parishes and the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, present a much
more favorable forum for plaintiffs-both from the standpoint of facing potential
motions for summary judgment and for getting the sympathy of the jury venire.
To date, no empirical study has been done to verify this perception' Moreover,
both the state legislature and the supreme court have in recent years become
much more pro-summary judgment, both from the legal standard and in the
courts' rulings. In addition, a federal court offers some advantages to a plaintiff
not available in state court, such as punitive damages, front pay and a much
higher standard governing the court's review of a jury verdict.
Nevertheless, this perception that a plaintiff is better off in state court
persists. Accordingly, in bringing actions in state courts against out-of-state
companies, plaintiffs have also joined as defendants the supervisors who either
made the alleged discriminatory decision affecting the plaintiff, or who had the
91. Repealed are former La. R.S. 23:892, 893, 971 (1985) to 23:975, 23:1001 to 23:1004
(1985). 23:1006 (1985) to 23:1008 (1997), 51:2242 to 51:2245 (1982).
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ultimate power to reverse such decision (who just happen to be domiciled in
Louisiana). Then, in maneuvers which have become almost automatic, the
defendant employer removes the case to federal court, alleging that the individual
resident defendant has been "fraudulently joined," and thus the federal court
possesses diversity jurisdiction.
In early skirmishes, wherein the issue was whether an individual could be
held liable under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006, the plain wording of the
statute's definition of "employer" led several courts to dismiss the joined
individuals as defendants and retain jurisdiction.92 However, after the enact-
ment of the Human Rights Commission Act, in a much-cited opinion, the late
Judge Arceneaux, in Alphonse v. Omni Hotels Management Corp.,93 rejected
such a holding. Noting that: (a) the legislature had intended to emulate the
federal legislation, such as Title VII; (b) several Louisiana courts had looked to
Title VII jurisprudence in resolving questions under state law; and, (c) Title VII
had then been held to impose liability upon individuals in their agency capacity,
Judge Arceneaux concluded that an action against a supervisor could be brought
under both Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006 and the Human Rights Commis-
sion Act despite the clearly different definitions of "employer" contained in the
respective statutes.94 Thereafter, despite a state court of appeal ruling to the
contrary,9" several Louisiana federal district judges followed the Alphonse
ruling.9"
Starting in 1991, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, federal
courts began increasingly to review whether individuals could be sued under
federal employment discrimination laws. In the seminal decision of Miller v.
Maxwell's International, Inc.," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no
liability could be imposed upon individual employees for violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 or of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.9' The Fifth Circuit appeared to wholeheartedly endorse the Ninth
92. See Koppman v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., No. 90-4503, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13669
(E.D. La. Sept. 19, 1991) (cannot sue individuals under 23:1006); Hammond v. Medical Arts Group,
Inc., 574 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (individual partner in medical clinic could not be sued).
93. 757 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1991).
94. Id. at 725.
95. Hammond, 574 So. 2d 521.
96. See Lee v. Entergy Operations, No. 93-0038, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6836 (E.D. La. May
12, 1993) (supervisors can be sued under 23:1006 and 51:2231); Edwards v. Nestle Beverage Co.,
61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1479 (E.D. La. 1993) (23:1006 allows for a cause of action against
supervisors based on Title VII). Contra Galbreth v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 631
(E.D. La. 1995) (fraudulent joinder argument successful; no individual liability under 23:1006 and
LCHRA; Alphonse overruled based on Grant v. Lone Star).
97. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
98. Id. at 587-88. To date, every circuit court of appeal which has considered the issue has
agreed with the Maxwell decision. See Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997);
Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996); Haynes v. Williams, 88
F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1996); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.
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Circuit's rulings in Grant v. Lone Star Co.," in 1994. However, in a decision
rendered at the about the same time, Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America,"'
the court seemed to be suggesting that supervisors, acting in their official
capacities, could still be sued as individuals under Title VII. These two rulings
led to many contradictory decisions on fraudulent joinder cases, particularly
within the Eastern District of Louisiana.' 0 ' Recently, Judge Clement, in Indest
v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., °2 effectively explained the dichotomy between
Grant and Atochem, by noting that:
The Fifth Circuit has also recognized that individual employees can be
liable in their official capacities under Title. VII, at least when they
occupy the position of the plaintiff's supervisor, with the power to hire
or fire her. Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 28 F.3d 446 (5th
Cir. 1994); see also Desormeaux, 1994 WL 586432 at *3. However,
the Fifth Circuit apparently has not addressed the question of whether
a company and its employee in his official capacity may be sued
together under Title VII ... [Defendant] argues that because [his
employer] would bear full responsibility for any assessment against him
in his official capacity, it is redundant for plaintiff to sue them both. To
support this position, he cites Allen v. Tulane University, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15641, 1993 WL 459949 (E.D. La., Nov. 2, 1993). In
Allen, the court cited the Fifth Circuit case of Sims v. Jefferson Downs
Racing Ass'n, 778 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1985) and concluded that
"outside of an action against an officer personally, a plaintiff does not
have an action against both the corporation and its officer in an official
capacity," because "entry of judgment against both the corporation [and
the officer] would ... effectively make the corporation liable twice for
the same act." Sims, 778 F.2d at 1081. Although Sims is grounded in
the Louisiana law principle that a corporation is liable for the torts of
its officers or agents committed in. the course and scope of their
employment, Title VII incorporates the similar principle that an
employer is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. The Court
is persuaded that the Sims analysis applies to this case." 3
1995); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Technology, Inc., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cit. 1995); Smith v. Lomax,
45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cit. 1995); Birkbeck v. Marvel
Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
99. Grant, 21 F.3d 649.
100. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cit. 1994).
101. Compare Ferrell v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-0568, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7588 (E.D. La.
May 30, 1995); Lee v. Entergy Operations, No. 93-38, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10617 (E.D. La. July
27, 1995); Delaune v. Boudreaux, 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 671 (E.D. La. 1995) with Scott
v. Eligibility Servs., No. 95-2799 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15961 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 1995); Galbreth
v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. La. 1995); Poche v. Travelers Ins. Cos., No.
95-1467, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10621 (E.D. La. July 26, 1995).
102. 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 587 (E.D. La. 1997).
103. M. (notes and emphasis omitted).
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Thereafter, most, if not all, of the decisions on this point have weighed in against
individual liability under Title VII' °
The Grant decision led several district courts to hold that no individual
liability could be imposed upon supervisors under Louisiana employment
discrimination laws, given the similarity between the state definitions of
"employer" in its age and general discrimination laws as compared to the
definitions in the federal ADEA and Title VII. Atochem, of course, supported
the minority view.' After Judge Clement's ruling in Indest, there were
only a few "holdout" judges though, who stubbornly continued to remand
such cases.' Several courts have held that an individual could be sued
as a "conspirator" under the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes
51:2256.'07
The new "Employment Discrimination Law" should remove all doubt and
debate from this issue. The definitions of "employer" under the Age, Disability,
Race-Creed-Color-Sex-NationalOrigin, Pregnancy and Sickle Cell sections of the
new law, while differing in the number of employees over which coverage
attaches, uniformly require that the employer employ a number of
employees from which it receives services in exchange for compensa-
tion.'08 Agency liability is also notably deleted from each definition.'"
The conspiracy section of the Commission on Human Rights Act,"0 as
will be discussed below, has been neutered. The issue is thus settled-only
employers can be sued for employment discrimination under Louisiana's
laws."
104. See supra note 98.
105. See supra note 100.
106. Smith v. HSC Hospitality, Inc., No. 96-1980, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12002 (E.D. La. Aug.
8, 1997) (allegations of complaint supported action against supervisor under La. R.S. 51:2231
(1997)).
107. Guerra v. National Tea Co., No. 95-2071, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11056 (E.D. La. Aug.
1, 1996); Lumpkin v. Griffin, No. 95-2680, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7816 (E.D. La. June 6, 1996);
Fluker v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, No. 954005, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5023 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1996).
108. La. R.S. 23:311(A), (B), 321(A), (B), 331(A), (B), 334(A), (B), 351(A), (B) (1998).
109. Id.
110. Former La. R.S. 51:2256 (1996).
11I. The legislature's actions will not end the war between plaintiffs and employers as to forum
selection. As a fallback position to naming the individual resident defendants under the state anti-
discrimination laws, plaintiffs have also joined them as defendants under various independent tort law
theories, such as defamation, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. To
quote Claude Rains, these "usual suspects" have spawned another defense tactic-deposing the
plaintiff and moving for summary judgment on these often bogus claims before a remand motion can
be decided. See Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1995); White v. Allstate
Ins. Co., No. 95-4234, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3212 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 1996). Of course, such a
tactic depends upon the federal judges' willingness to hear the summary judgment motion. See Smith
v. HSC Hospitality, Inc., No. 96-1980, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12002 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 1997)
(allegations of complaint supported action against supervisor under intentional infliction of emotional
distress, court refused to hear summary judgment motion).
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2. Availability of Front Pay
Prior to the new law, Louisiana's employment discrimination statutes were
silent as to whether an award of "front pay" could be given to a plaintiff. The
concept of "front pay" was developed by federal courts under Title VII and the
ADEA to provide victims of discrimination with full "make whole" relief."'
Under both statutes, the favored remedy was reinstatement to the employee's past
position."' However, the courts recognized that such a remedy was not always
a practical solution, given the parties' potentially bitter attitudes towards each
other." ' In other cases, intervening events, such as a plant shutdown, might
have foreclosed the reinstatement remedy." 5 So, the substitute remedy of
"front pay" was developed. In effect, "front pay" is that amount of compensa-
tion a plaintiff will need, projecting into the future, to allow them to be in the
same position they would have enjoyed had the unlawful discrimination not taken
place." Over the years, federal courts have struggled with the question as to
whether the judge or the jury should decide whether reinstatement versus an
award of front pay is appropriate,"' as well as the amount of front pay to be
awarded, given a plaintiff's obligation to mitigate damages."'
While Louisiana's employment discrimination statutes did not contain any
provisions specifically authorizing awards of front pay, the remedial provisions
did contain broad language such as "legal or equitable relief," "all remedies
available under the law ... including, but not limited to, compensatory damages,
attorneys' fees, costs, and any other relief deemed appropriate," "general or
special damages," "compensatory damages," "actual damages" and injunctive
relief. Given the broad nature of the above provisions, as well as the express
statutory purposes to emulate federal laws, courts generally included front pay
as a remedy for plaintiffs."19
112. See Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448-49 (1 ith Cir. 1985); Hansard
v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir. 1989).
113. Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1990) (ADEA); Shore v. Federal
Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1985) (Title VII).
114. Goldstein, 758 F.2d at 1449 (front pay appropriate when "discord and antagonism between
the parties would render reinstatement ineffective as a make-whole remedy").
115. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268-69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976).
116. Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1994).
117. Compare Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.
1987) (judge must decide question of whether front pay is appropriate and amount of such award)
with Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865'F.2d 1461, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 842, 110 S. Ct. 129 (1989) (trial judge must determine initially that front pay is appropriate,
then jury must determine the amount of the award).
I 18. See, e.g., Dunlap-McCuller v. The Riese Org., 980 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1992) (seven weeks
in view that plant was scheduled to close down); Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d
117 (2d Cir. 1996) (twenty years of difference between current pay and past pay).
119. See Delchamps, 897 F.2d 815 (front pay damages are available under LADEA, up to five
years in this case).
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Under the new law, however, age discrimination is remedied by "back pay,
reinstatement, reasonable attorneys fees and court costs," disability discrimination
by "compensatory damages, back pay, benefits, reinstatement, reasonable attorney
fees and court costs," race-sex-religious-national origin discrimination by
"compensatory damages, back pay, benefits, reinstatement, reasonable attorneys'
fees and court costs," and sickle cell trait discrimination by "compensatory
damages, back pay,.benefits, reinstatement, reasonable attorneys' fees and court
costs." By eliminating such terms as "general or special damages," "actual
damages," and "other relief deemed appropriate," it is clear that the legislature
intended to narrow the relief courts and juries could afford. And, by specifically
listing ."back pay" as an item of damages, but omitting "front pay," by
implication, the legislature must have meant to foreclose that remedy.
In so doing, however, the legislature left open a counter argument sure to
engender litigation. By retaining "compensatory damages" as an item of relief
in the disability, race-sex-religious-national origin and sickle cell sections, the
legislature left open the possibility that "front pay" could still be available.
B. Unresolved Issues
1. The Future of the Commission on Human Rights
The "Louisiana Employment Discrimination Act" did not make any
substantive changes to the functions of the Louisiana Commission on Human
Rights ("LCHR"). While certain provisions of the LCHR Act delineating the
functions of the Commission were deleted, the new law transferred those same
functions back in a new provision.20 So, as before, the Louisiana Commission
on Human Rights is, in theory, an active state agency under the Louisiana
Department of Labor. Under a "Memorandum of Understanding" reached
between the LCHR and the EEOC in 1993, a charging party filing a charge with
either agency will be considered to also have filed a charge with the other. In
addition, each agency is charged with investigating and resolving charges that are
originally filed with it. In a separate agreement, the EEOC has also agreed to
compensate the LCHR for any cases it processes-as it does with other state
agencies it "defers" to in the rest of the country. Since Louisiana is now a
jurisdiction with a "deferral agency," charging parties have up to three hundred
(300) days in which to file a timely charge with the EEOC.
Theoretically, agencies such as the LCHR and the EEOC serve the practical
purpose of bringing the potential plaintiffs and defendants together at an early
stage prior to litigation-whereby after the agency's preliminary investigation,
each party can size up the other party's arguments and make an early decision
to amicably resolve their differences. As the late Joseph Rauh, the noted civil
120. La. R.S. 51:2231(C) (1997). Unfortunately, adequate funding to perform these functions
was not provided.
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rights activist put it, administrative remedies are to court remedies as wholesale
is to retail. Clearly, for plaintiffs who are unwilling or unable to obtain quality
legal representation, such agencies are the only avenue to relief.
In reality, the LCHR cannot hope to achieve the above effect. Practically,
its only effect has been to extend the charge filing period. At present, the
Commission on Human Rights has a staff of two persons in its Baton Rouge
office-clearly inadequate to perform any of the statutory and/or contractual
tasks for which it is responsible. Year after year, the legislature has refused to
increase its funding of the Commission and private donations have not been large
enough to allow for any growth of its enforcement staff. Proponents of the
agency's existence, such as Professor Joel Friedman of Tulane, have argued that
it will permit Louisiana to address employment discrimination without "federal
intervention." Critics of the agency have asserted that given the long pre-
Commission operation of the EEOC in Louisiana, such "federal intervention" is
now an accepted fact of life. Further, given that the legislature has now reduced
the number of employers covered by state law by raising the employee level to
fifteen-the exact same number covered by the EEOC-there is doubt that the
state should undertake funding such an agency whose statutory obligations are
already being performed by a federal agency.
After weighing the above arguments, the author must come down on the side
of the Agency's critics. While the EEOC is not without its critics, it has usefully
served as a clearinghouse for unmeritorious charges and honorably as a
settlement catalyst over the past twenty-five years in Louisiana. Unless the
legislature decides to adequately fund the continued existence of the LCHR in
order to enable it to perform such functions effectively, it should be allowed to
die a peaceful death.
2. Retaliation
One glaring omission in the new law is the failure of the legislature to
include a broad provision prohibiting an employer from retaliating against an
employee who asserts rights under the law. Again, by "cutting and pasting" the
old legal provisions, the causes of action differ nonsensically-based upon the
underlying type of discrimination. Apparently, a Louisiana plaintiff may sue his
employer for retaliation based upon his or her opposition to, or participation in
any proceeding against, age discrimination or sickle-cell trait discrimina-
tion-although the legislature uses the term "discriminate" rather than "retali-
ate.'' However, there is no retaliation provision with regard to claims of
disability or pregnancy discrimination. Perhaps even more significantly, given
the number of claims arising in the various areas, the legislature failed to include
a retaliation provision in Part IV of the new law relating to discrimination based
on race, color, sex, religion or national origin.
121. La. R.S. 23:312(D); 23:352(D) (1998).
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Given the "cut and paste" tactics of the authors of the new law, this current
situation mirrors prior law-with one glaring exception. Section 23:1006 did not
contain an express retaliation provision.'22 Nor did the Civil Rights Act for
Handicapped Persons contain a retaliation provision. However, LADEA did
prohibit retaliation.'23 Most importantly, the Commission on Human Rights
Act did contain an express retaliation provision at Section 51:2256' 24-a
provision which the authors chose to retain in the old law, but apparently has no
application to the new law 2S-perhaps because, among other things, that
provision allowed for individual liability for those who committed such acts of
retaliation and for those who participated in conspiracies to violate the
122. Brouillette v. Transamerican Ref. Corp., No. 95-9584, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17216 (E.D.
La. Nov. 15, 1995) (no retaliation claim under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006. but one exists
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:2256); Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Group, 66 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 667 (E.D. La. 1994) (Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006 does not support a claim for
retaliation); Longnecker v. Transco Energy Co., No. 93-2686, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9999 (E.D.
La. July 18, 1994) (no cause of action for retaliation under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006 or
Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:2242, but one does exist for Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:2256).
123. Former La. R.S. 23:972(D) (1985).
124. Former La. R.S. 51:2256 (1997). See Greenwell v. Raytheon Aerospace., Inc., No. 95-
2138, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3757 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 1996) (individual can be sued for retaliation
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:2256); Hailey v. Hickingbottom, No. 30, 728, 1998 La. App.
LEXIS 1636 (La. App. 2d Cir. June 24, 1998).
125. To determine the exact construction the legislature intended to give to the retained Section
51:2256 is a formidable task. First, that section states as follows:
§ 2256. Conspiracy to Violate this Chapter Unlawful.
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person or two or more persons to conspire:
(I) To retaliate, or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed
a practice declared unlawful by this Chapter, or because he has made a charge, filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this Chapter.
(2) To aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce a person to engage in any of the acts or
practices declared unlawful by this Chapter.
(3) To obstruct or prevent a person from complying with the provisions of this Chapter
or any order issued thereunder.
(4) To resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with the commission, or any of its members
or representatives, in the lawful performance of duty under this Chapter.
From the above language, it is reasonable to assume that a plaintiff claiming "retaliation" must be
able to point to a right protected by that "chapter," i.e. revised Chapter 38 of Title 51. However, the
revised Chapter 38 does not contain any prohibitions against employment discrimination. Thus, the
sfill existing provisions of Sections 51:2256 and 51:2264 (authorizing civil actions) would appear to
have no application to the employment setting-except perhaps to prohibit retaliation against those
who file a charge with the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights.
A counter-argument could be made that the legislature, by assigning enforcement powers to the
Commission over various types of employment discrimination, in Section 51:2231 (C), meant for
those rights in Section 23:301 et seq. to be incorporated by reference into Chapter 38-such that the
conspiracy to retaliate and/or discriminate provisions in Section 51:2256 would still have some teeth.
However, given that the legislature clearly intended to do away with individual liability, such a
construction seems improbable.
1050 [Vol. 58
GERALD J. "JERRY" HUFFMAN, JR.
Act.' 6  Hopefully, this omission will be cured in the next legislative ses-
sion-as proposed later in this paper.
3. Prescriptive Periods
As with prior law, the new law is silent as to what prescriptive period
applies to employment discrimination actions. Under the old laws, courts
analogized employment discrimination actions to tort or "delictual" actions, such
that the one year period of Civil Code article 3492 was applicable. 2 Louisi-
ana courts also looked to federal precedent to determine when the prescriptive
period starts to run,1 28 what constitutes a "continuing violation,"'29 and when,
if ever, is prescription interrupted or tolled. 30 By not changing the new law
to reflect a particular prescriptive period, the legislature apparently has approved
of the courts' adoption of the one year period and the federal jurisprudence
regarding ancillary questions.
However, a separate enactment, not part of the "Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law" Act, has created some ambiguity in this area. Act No.
1123, signed by Governor Foster on July 14, 1997, created Section 23:333 (C),
providing as follows:
The prescriptive period, applicable to a plaintiff s cause of action under
the provisions of this statute, shall be suspended during the pendency of
126. See supra note 125. See also Greenwell, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3757; Guerra v. National
Tea Co., No. 95-2071, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11056 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 1996) (no individual liability
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006-but individuals can be liable for participating in
conspiracy under Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:2256); Lumpkin v. Griffin, No. 95-2680 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7816 (E.D. La. June 6, 1996) (individuals can be sued as "conspirators" under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 51:2256); Fluker v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, No. 95-4005, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5023
(E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1996) (Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:2256 allows for claims against individuals
involved in conspiracies).
127. See Jay v. International Salt Co., 868 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1989) (one year period applies to
actions under LADEA); Williams v. Conoco, Inc., 860 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1988) (Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1006 actions governed by a one year limitations period); Fussell v. Bellsouth Telecomm.,
Inc., No. 96-1660, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 251 (E.D. La. Jan. 9, 1998) (actions under Louisiana Civil
Rights Act for Handicapped Persons).
128. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S. Ct. 498 (1980), cited in Jay, 868
F.2d 179 and Fullsell, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 251. Compare Winbush v. Normal Life of La., Inc.,
599 So. 2d 489,491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (prescriptive period begins to run when plaintiffis told
he will be terminated) with Harris v. Home Say. and Loan Ass'n, 663 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1995) (uncertain written notice of intent to terminate does not start prescriptive period).
129. Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992) (adopting federal "continuing violation"
theory with respect to prescription relating to a claim of sexual harassment).
130. Koppman v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 345 (E.D. La.
1992) (federal "equitable estoppel" doctrine analogized to Louisiana's "ill practices" doctrine whereby
"one may not seek the benefits of prescription where one engages in 'ill practices' that 'hinder,
impede or prevent the plaintiff from timely asserting her cause of action."') (citing Nathan v. Carter,
372 So. 2d 560, 562 (La. 1979)).
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any administrative review or investigation of the claim conducted by the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Louisiana
Commission on Human Rights, but in no event longer than eighteen
months.
The purpose of the bill was obviously to protect potential plaintiffs who were
"asleep at the agency" while their state law claims were prescribing.'
Implicitly, by limiting the effect of such a suspension of the prescriptive period
to eighteen months at most, the new provision seemingly gives legislative
approval to the courts' application of the one year prescriptive period of Civil
Code Article 3492 for situations where no administrative complaint is filed.'
Unfortunately, as one court has noted, this protection now only extends to
those who file race, color, sex, religion or national origin claims under Section
23:333-and not to claims for age discrimination, disability discrimination,
pregnancy discrimination or sickle cell trait discrimination. 33 That court also
impliedly suggested that the eighteen month prescriptive period applied to all
claims brought under Section 23:333, regardless of whether an administrative
complaint had been filed. ' 31
131. See Brouillette v. Transamerican Ref. Corp., No. 95-0584, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17216
(E.D. La. Nov. 15, 1995) (plaintiff's filing of administrative proceedings did not operate to toll or
suspend the prescriptive period on plaintiffs state law claims); Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Dillard Dep't Stores, No. 92-3552, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10358 (E.D. La. July 27,
1994) (prescriptive periods governing actions under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006 and LCHRA
are not tolled by the filing of an EEOC charge); Silva v. P.F. Collier, Inc., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1495 (E.D. La. 1992) (one year prescriptive period is not tolled by filing of an EEOC
charge).
132. See Jay v. International Salt Co., 868 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1989) (LADEA action is subject
to one year prescriptive period of Louisiana Civil Code article 3492); Warfield v. Rice-Melby Enters.,
68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 957 (E.D. La. 1995) (actions filed under Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1006 and 51:2231 prescribe in one year); Winbush v. Normal Life of Louisiana, Inc., 599 So. 2d
489 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (state court adopts fifth circuit opinion in Williams v. Conoco, Inc., 860
F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1988), that one year prescriptive period of CCA 3492 governs actions under
23:1006), Fussell v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., No. 95-1660 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 251 (E.D. La.
Jan. 9, 1998) (actions under Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2251 governed by one year prescriptive
period).
133. Benton v. Zapata Protein, Inc., No. 97-3330, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 756 (E.D. La. Jan.
22, 1998). Therein, the court stated:
Act 1409 "consolidated all employment discrimination provisions of state law in one
Chapter of Law." The age discrimination law was re-codified as Part If of that Chapter,
R.S. 23:311-314, which Part still does not provide a prescriptive period. The law related
to race, color, etc., with its eighteen-month prescriptive period, was re-codified as Part IV
of the Chapter, R.S. 23:331-334. The eighteen-month period does not apply to age
discrimination claims. The one-year period still applies and plaintiffs state law claims
prescribed before the filing of this action.
Benton, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 756.
134. Benton, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 756. Prior to the above quote, the court also stated that
"Act 1123 of 1997 amended only § 1006 (race, color, etc.) to provide an eighteen-month prescriptive
period."
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4. Plaintiff's Duty to Mitigate
Under federal employment discrimination laws, courts have.imposed a duty
upon all plaintiffs claiming to have suffered from discrimination an obligation
to engage in good faith efforts to mitigate their damages." To date, under
jurisprudence interpreting Louisiana's employment discrimination laws, courts
have also imposed that duty upon Louisiana plaintiffs.' 36
Nevertheless, an argument has been, and probably will continue to be made,
that no such obligation should exist in Louisiana. Proponents of this view assert
that the federal obligation to mitigate is based upon common law principles
requiring plaintiffs in breach of contract cases to mitigate their damages. But,
under Louisiana Civil CodeArticle 2749, stating that an individual employed for
a definite term can only be terminated for "serious ground of complaint," also
indicated that in the event that he is not terminated for cause, his damages
amount to the difference between what he should have received under the
contract and what he did in fact receive. 137 No mitigation is required.'
3 s
Since the legislature failed to address this issue in the new law, the argument
remains open. As a management lawyer, I admit that I am in favor of the
mitigation requirement. Moreover, despite the provisions of Article 2749, and
the cases interpreting it, Louisiana does generally require plaintiffs in breach of
contract actions to mitigate their damages. 39
5. When Is an "Employer" an "Employer"?
One of the criticisms made of the old laws were the different employee-
number levels required for employer coverage. Unfortunately, the new law
retains some, if not all, of these dichotomies. The following table shows the
coverage levels for the different types of prohibited discrimination:
135. The Supreme Court, in Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 458
U.S. 219, 231-32, 102 S. Ct. 3057,. 3065-66 (1982), stated:
An unemployed or underemployed claimant, like all other Title VII claimants, is subject
to the statutory duty to minimize damages set out in § 706(g). This duty, rooted in an
ancient principle of law, requires the claimant to use reasonable diligence in finding other
suitable employment. Although the unemployed or underemployed claimant need not go
into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position, he forfeits his
right to backpay if he refuses a job substantially equivalent to the one he was denied.
136. See Warren v. Blockbuster Music, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 1454 (E.D. La. 1997); Mire
v. Marino, No. 91-4278, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9336 (E.D. La. July 2, 1993); Guillory v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 662 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
137. See Carlson v. Ewing, 219 La. 961, 54 So. 2d 414 (1951).
138. Andrepont v. Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal Dist., 602 So. 2d 704 (La. 1992).
139. La. Civ. Code art. 2002. See also Glazer v. Glazer, 278 F. Supp. 476, 485 n.21 (E.D. La.
1968) ("In the absence of LSA-C.C. Art. 2749, the rule in Louisiana appears to require ... that




EDL Section Type of Discrimination Employee No. for
Coverage
23:311 (A) Age 20
23:321 (A) Disability 15
23:331 (A) Race, Color, Religion, 15
Sex and National
Origin
23:241 (A) Pregnancy 25
23:351 (A) Sickle Cell Trait 20
There are two apparent problems with the new scheme. First, under the above
scheme, an employer with seventeen employees must not discriminate with
respect-to disability, race, color, religion, sex and national origin, but is perfectly
free to discriminate on the basis of age, pregnancy and sickle cell trait. While
there are some legitimate policy considerations supporting different levels of
coverage for the pregnancy leave laws, "0 such considerations would appear not
to apply towards differing levels for age and sickle cell trait discrimination.
Second, by raising the minimum number of employee requirement for any
coverage at all to fifteen employees, the legislature has ensured that Louisiana's
employment discrimination laws will not reach any further down into small
workplaces than the federal Title VIIl-which also sets coverage for employers
with fifteen employees. The question must then be raised-why even have these
provisions-given that Title VII actions, as well as other federal employment
discrimination provisions, can be filed in state court.
6. Applicability of ADR to Employment Discrimination Actions
The old "Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Persons" contained a provision
whereby a plaintiff had to give thirty (30) days' notice to a defendant that a
140. Small employers, for example, could argue that they suffer a much greater burden in
providing four months of leave to a pregnant employee than larger employers. However, one federal
court recently failed to detect such a distinction, in construing prior law support. In Lapeyronnie v.
Dimitri Eye Center, Inc., 693 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997), the court held that an
employer with less than twenty-five employees could nevertheless be prohibited from committing
pregnancy discrimination by virtue of the sex discrimination provisions of the LCHR, "[slince the
expressed purpose of the act was to minor Title VII its prohibition against sex discrimination
necessarily included pregnancy discrimination."
141. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990) (Title VII
actions); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 29 (1991) (ADEA
actions).
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court action would be filed-each party then bearing a good faith obligation to
attempt to settle the matter." 2 While this provision was retained in the new
law with respect to disability discrimination, 4 it was not extended to other
employment discrimination actions. Since the new "Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law," unlike the federal Title VII, does not require that any
administrative agency remedies be exhausted prior to the onset of litigation, such
suits can continue to be filed without the parties being mandated to take any
steps to achieve a pre-litigation resolution. Nor did the legislature speak to the
growing trend to refer such cases to various forms of alternative dispute
resolution, such as voluntary or court-ordered mediation or arbitration. 44
Given the failure of the legislature to adequately fund the Commission on
Human Rights, an agency which could have the salutary effect of eliminating the
extreme cases from litigation-such as those which are frivolous or obviously
without merit and those cases where employer liability is equally obvious, an
alternative measure by which the parties could be required to settle their
differences prior to litigation via some neutral forum has apparent social utility.
Utilization of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms will be proposed later
herein.
7. Standards for Awarding Fees to Defendants
Each one of the sub-sections of the new "Employment Discrimination Law"
allow the court to award a plaintiff attorneys' fees as a part of the available
remedies' 45 However, there is no uniformity among the statutory provisions
as to when an award of attorneys' fees would be appropriate to a prevailing
defendant.
Under federal law, a prevailing defendant in an employment discrimination
action is usually not entitled to attorneys' fees unless the plaintiff's action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in
subjective bad faith.'" In theory, this same principle could be applied to
Louisiana's employment discrimination laws with respect to prevailing
defendants-but for the wording of the different attorneys' fees provisions.
142. Former La. R.S. 46:2256(B) (1982). One court has held that this provision is satisfied
implicitly when a plaintiff files a charge under the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which will then afford
the parties an opportunity to "conciliate" the matter. Snear v. Tumbull Cone Baking Co., No. 93-
2761, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1059 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 1994).
143. La. R.S. 23:325(C) (1998).
144. See supra note 15. One court has recently held, however, that Louisiana employment
discrimination actions are subject to mandatory arbitration agreements. Freeman v. Minolta, 699 So.
2d 1182 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997).
145. La. R.S. 23:313, 325(A), 333(A). 353 (1998).
146. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412,
98 S. Ct. 694 (1978).
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For example, under the age discrimination section, a plaintiff can seek
attorneys' fees-but the provision is silent as to defendants. 4 However, the
attorneys' fees provision in the disability discrimination section provides that
"[a]ny party filing suit under this Part who fails to prevail in his cause of action
shall be held responsible for reasonable attorney fees and all court costs at the
discretion of the judge."'" The main section dealing with race-sex-color-
national origin-religious discrimination provides that "[a]ny plaintiff found by the
judge to have brought a frivolous claim under this Part shall be held responsible
for reasonable damages incurred as a result of the claim, reasonable attorney fees,
and court costs." Finally, the sickle-cell trait section provides only that plaintiffs
may be awarded attorneys' fees." 9
As with other matters discussed herein, there is no logical reason to allow
for defendants to recoup their fees under some theories of discrimination, but not
under others. Again, a proposal below will suggest a fix for this problem.
C. Disability Discrimination Issues
Perhaps no other area of discrimination law is in as great a period of flux
as in the development of case law under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 50
Basic workplace concepts, such as the need to be physically present in the
workplace and the employer's prerogative to set a job's duties, are being. re-
examined every day by the courts. '5 1 Thus, unlike in other areas of discrimina-
tion, where Louisiana courts have a large body of federal case law to draw upon,
in the area of disability law, there is virtually a "clean -slate." Given this
situation, the differences between the language of the federal ADA and the
disability section of the new Discrimination Law give Louisiana courts the
opportunity to take disability law in different directions than those chosen by
federal judges.
1. "Essential Functions" Versus "Duties of Position"
One of the central tenets of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act" 2
is that an employer need not change the "essential functions" of its jobs in
accommodating the disabilities of applicants and employees who are otherwise
qualified disabled individuals.'53 Furthermore, the ADA provides that the
147. La. R.S. 23:313 (1998).
148. La. R.S. 23:325(B) (1998).
149. La. R.S. 23:353 (1998).
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
151. See Robert B. Gordon & Christopher L. Ekman, Attendance Control Issues Under the ADA
and FML4, 13 Labor Lawyer 393 (1997); Gregory J. Kamer & Barbara D. DeSouza, The Light Duty
Dilemma, 12 Labor Lawyer 247 (1996).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995 & Supp. 1998)..
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1995).
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employer's judgment as to what those essential functions are will be given
deference if the employer has prepared a written job description before
advertising or interviewing applicants for the position in question.1
4
The new disabilities provisions in the Employment Discrimination Law
provide that an "otherwise qualified disabled person" means a disabled person
who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such person holds or desires."'" In turn, "essential
functions" are defined as "the fundamental job duties of the employment position
the disabled person holds or desires" but do not include the "marginal functions
of the position." "' There is no reference to an employer's judgment or to a
pre-existing written job description. In addition, all of the prohibited practices,
defined in the chapter, speak in terms of the disabled individual's "ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or position."'" Accordingly, Louisiana
courts can enjoy much more latitude in second-guessing an employer's
classification of job functions than federal judges can in applying federal law.
2. Are Certain Cases Now Covered?
As discussed above, the new Louisiana provision regarding disability
discrimination fails to exclude various classes of individuals specificallyexcluded
by the federal ADA."8 For example, the ADA authorizes religious entities to
discriminate in favor of their adherents. The ADA also excludes from its
coverage current users of illegal drugs, transvestites, transsexuals, homosexuals,
compulsive gamblers, kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs. Louisiana courts are now
free, with a clean slate, to determine if such individuals are "otherwise qualified
individuals with a disability."
III. RELATIONSHIP OF PREGNANCY LEAVE LAW TO FMLA
The legislature left the Pregnancy Discrimination Law largely untouched in
the new law. While the language of the bill is somewhat inartful, the law
appears to create a four month "floor" of unpaid pregnancy leave for Louisiana
females. 59 Since the enactment of this provision, however, Congress passed
the Family Medical Leave Act of 1992,6 ° providing that an employee shall be
entitled to a total of twelve (12) work weeks of leave during any twelve month
period in order to take care of a new-born or adopted child; to take care of a
spouse, son, daughter or parent with a serious health condition or because of the
154. Id.
155. La. R.S. 23:322(8) (1998).
156. La. R.S. 23:322(5) (1998).
157. See La. R.S. 23:323(B)(I), (2), (3) (1998).
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(c), (d), 12114, 12210, 12211 (1995).
159. See La. R.S. 23:342(2)(b) (1998).
160. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1998).
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employee's own serious health condition."" Given that the Louisiana Pregnan-
cy Leave Law does not provide for leave with respect to matters other than
pregnancy, it is now possible that a Louisiana female employee, who might
become pregnant in the same year she has to take care of a sick relative, could
"piggy-back" the federal and state leave laws into an eight month leave.
The pregnancy discrimination provision, both under the old and the new
forms, has internal inconsistencies which the legislature failed to address. For
example Section 23:342(2)(a)(ii) provides that "[n]o employer shall be required
to provide a female employee disability leave on account of normal pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical condition for a period exceeding six weeks." The
very next section, however, Section 23:342(2)(b), requires that an employer allow
a female employee "[tlo take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable
period of time, provided such period shall not exceed four months." Similarly,
Section 23:342(3) requires an employer with a policy, practice or collective
bargaining agreement allowing for light duty transfers to apply such a policy to
pregnant employees. The following section requires that the employer do so,
even if it does not have such a policy-provided that in so doing, no additional
employment is created, no employees are discharged and no non-qualified
employees are promoted.'62
IV. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS
To be fair, the new law has accomplished its main purpose in consolidating
Louisiana's hodge-podge of employment discrimination laws to one place.
Furthermore, it is probable that its passage through the legislative labyrinth was
made possible by the assurance that it would not make any significant substantive
changes to the old laws. Nevertheless, in view of the new issues the new law
has created, as well as the old issues left unresolved, the following suggestions
are made for the next Legislative session.
First, as stated above, it makes no sense that the different types of
discrimination prohibitions should not apply to employers of equal sizes.
Therefore, I suggest that there be one central definition of employer in the
beginning "Definitions" section of the law. Furthermore, given that the law
should apply to more employers than the federal laws, the number of employees
should be uniformly set at ten (10). To avoid supervisory liability, the same
requirements regarding the provision of services and giving of compensation
could be retained.
Second, there should be a central provision, governing all types of
discrimination, setting forth the right to file a court action, the applicable
prescriptive period, the available remedies, the plaintiffs duty to mitigate
damages and when, if ever, attorneys' fees should be awarded to both parties.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(I) (1998).
162. La. R.S. 23:342(4) (1998).
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In addition, "front pay" should be restored as an available remedy, in order to
provide victims of discrimination with full "make-whole" relief.
Third, a central provision should be inserted providing that employers and
labor organizations are prohibited from retaliating against those who oppose
practices made unlawful by the law and/or who participate in administrative
and/or judicial proceedings under the law. Clearly, allowing employers who
practice racial, sexual, national origin or religious discrimination to retaliate
against those who object undermines the whole public policy supporting the laws
in the first place.
Fourth, if it is not ever going to be adequately funded, the Louisiana
Commission on Human Rights should be allowed to cease its operations, thereby
allowing the federal EEOC to better perform its central functions in Louisiana.
In place of the LCHR, a provision should be inserted in the law authorizing
various forms of alternative dispute resolution to resolve claims made under the
law, similar to provisions contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "' and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.'" The issue as to whether such
measures can include mandatory arbitration could also be thrashed out.
Fifth, the disability provisions should be amended to more closely resemble
their federal counterpart provisions in the ADA. An employer should be allowed
to have the "first crack" at determining what are the "essential functions" of a
job. The legislature should also affirmatively deal with the issues as to whether
drug users, alcoholics, transvestites, transsexuals and homosexuals should be
given rights under the law
Sixth, given the existence of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, the
pregnancy leave law should be repealed, as it clearly would not be practical for
a business with between ten and fifty employees to comply with the law. In its
place, the legislature should include in the sex discrimination section a statement
that discrimination based on sex includes "on account of pregnancy," similar to
the language inserted by Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment
of 1978.165
V. THE NEW LOUISIANA "WHISTLEBLOWER" LAW' 6
In addition to re-arranging the state's employment discrimination laws, the
legislature also enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:967 which specifically
protects any employee who discloses illegal workplace acts, provides information
to or testifies before any public body investigating an illegal workplace act or
refuses to participate in any illegal workplace act. 67 Our state has always been
163. Pub.L.No. 102-166, 105 Sat 1074, § 118.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
166. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Sue Ann Kelly, who assisted in
the preparation of this section of the paper.
167. 1997 La. Acts No. 1104.
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defined as an employment "at-will" jurisdiction, in which an employer can
discharge an employee for any reason or for no reason, with the exception that
the employee's constitutional or statutory rights cannot be violated. 16 Howev-
er, the courts faced an interesting dilemma when asked to consider whether an
employee could legally be fired for refusal to perform an illegal act on behalf of
his employer, in the absence of a specific statute which prohibited the employer
from terminating the employee. Courts struggled to strike a balance between
promoting public policy and adhering to Louisiana's time-honored employment
at-will doctrine.
In 1982, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that an employee
may be lawfully discharged for refusing to pirform an illegal act, as long as the
termination by the employer does not violate the employee's constitutional or
statutory rights.' 69 The Court observed that while the employee's public policy
arguments were appealing, broad policy considerations creating exceptions to the
employment at-will doctrine should not be considered by the court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court also struggled with this dilemma in 1992 in
Cheramie v. Plaisance.'7" In Cheramie, the Court addressed whether- an
employee could be fired because he reported the fact that his employer had
committed an environmental law violation. Avoiding any discussion of the
employment at-will doctrine, the Court ruled that the employee's action was
protected under Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2027(B) of the Louisiana
Environmental Quality Act. However, the court did not address whether the
employee's actions would have been protected in the absence of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30:2027(B).
Following these cases, it appeared that an employer could legally fire an
employee who refused to engage in an illegal workplace act or who threatened
to disclose an illegal workplace practice as long as no specific statute prohibited
it. Realistically, most employers were free to terminate employees who refused
to engage in illegal workplace acts because only a few statutes prohibited it in
certain types of industry (i.e. Louisiana Environmental Quality Act).
Now, that has all changed-Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:967 provides that
an employer shall not take reprisal against an employee who in good faith, and
after advising the employer of the violation of the law, discloses or threatens to
disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of state law, provides
information to or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation,
hearing or inquiry into any violation of law, or objects to or refuses to participate
in* an employment act or practice that is in violation of the law. Reprisal is
broadly defined and includes firing, layoff, loss of benefits, or any discriminatory
action the court finds was taken as a result of an action by the employee that is
168. La. Civ. Code art. 2747. See Brannan v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 526 So. 2d 1101 (La. 1988).
169. Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 379
(La. 1982).
170. 595 So. 2d 619 (La. 1992).
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protected under the statute. Employers who violate Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:967 are subject to suit by the employee who may recover damages which are
defined as compensatory damages, back pay, benefits, reinstatement, reasonable
attorney fees, and court costs.
Employees are not, however, automatically protected under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:967. Section 967(A) specifically provides that an employer
shall not take reprisal against an employee who in good faith, and after advising
the employer of the violation discloses an illegal act, refuses to perform an illegal
act or participates in an official investigation into the illegal act. Therefore, the
employee must in good faith believe his employer is actually engaged in an
illegal act. In addition, before the employee takes any action, he must notify the
employer that he believes the employer is participating in an illegal workplace
act.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:967 also, unlike some of the discrimination
provisions, provides some protection for the employer against frivolous suits.
Section (D) provides that if a suit or complaint is brought in bad faith or if it
should be determined by a court that the employer's act or practice was not in
violation of the law, the employer may be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and
court costs from the employee.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS ADDED PROVISIONS
A. Medical Costs Reimbursement
Act 1398, signed by Governor Foster on July 15, 1997, provides that an
employer may recoup the costs of pre-employment medical examinations and
drug tests, provided that:
1) The agreement is in writing,
2) The employee is paid at least $1 per hour more than the federal
minimum wage (currently $5.15 per hour),
3) The employee is hired on a full-time basis,
4) The employee works less than ninety working days, and
5) The employee resigns for any reason other than a substantial change
to the employment relationship made by the employer.
If these criteria are fulfilled, an employer may withhold from an employee's
final paycheck the costs of a pre-employment medical examination and/or drug
test. Of course, if the employee works longer than ninety days, or if the
employer terminates the relationship, Louisiana law still prohibits an employer
from requiring an employee to pay the costs of pre-employment medical
examinations and/or drug tests.'17
171. La. R.S. 23:897 (1985).
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The only ambiguity in the law which might create difficulties for employers
is the requirement that the employee's resignation be unrelated to any "substan-
tial changes in the employment relationship made by the employer," as
determined by the Louisiana Employment Security Law, i.e. the unemployment
statutes. 72 Generally, under current law, an employee who voluntarily resigns
his employment for reasons unrelated to a substantial change in the relationship
made by the employer is not eligible for unemployment compensation." 3
Previously, the employee's qualification for unemployment compensation was
based upon whether he left the employer for "good cause" connected with the
job."4 The meaning of the phrase has been the subject of many cases before
the Office of Employment Security, its Board of Review and Louisiana state
courts. Recent decisions have held that a "substantial change" to the employment
relationship occurs when the employer alters the wages, hours, working
conditions, benefits, or location of work, without the approval of the employ-
ee.' 7 If such a change occurs and the employee consents, his later action in
resigning will not be deemed due to the change.
In most cases where an employee leaves before ninety days, the employee
will have left simply because he did not like the work. An employee's mere
dissatisfaction with his wages, hours and/or working conditions does not
constitute a substantial change to the employment relationship." 6 Nor will an
employer's enforcement of productivity standards, including reprimanding an
employee, justify an employee's resignation.' 7
B. Vacation Pay Clarification
The legislature also tackled an issue that had been the subject of much
litigation under Louisiana's Wage Payment Law." 8 In Act No. 56, the
legislature enacted Section 23:631 D, regarding when an employer must pay
earned, but unused, vacation pay to an employee upon his or her separation. 79
Under this amendment, vacation pay will be considered an "amount due under
the terms of employment,"' 80 if under the employer's "stated vacation policy":
I. the employee is deemed eligible and has accrued the right to take
vacation time with pay, and
172. La. R.S. 23:1601 (1998).
173. Id.
174. Former La. R.S. 23:1601 (1985).
175. See Gray v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 635 So. 2d 1284 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Gaudin
Equip. and Supply Co. v. Administrator, 534 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
176. Clemons v. Blache, 501 So. 2d 1020 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Joubert v. Blache, 488 So
2d 749 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
177. McClodden v. Gerace, 522 So. 2d 1379 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
178. La. R.S. 23:631, 632 (1998).
179. 1997 La. Acts No. 56, codified at La. i-S. 23:631(D) (1998).
180. La. R.S. 23:631(A) (1998).
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II. the employee has not been compensated for such vacation pay as of
the date of his discharge or resignation.'8 '
The law further provides that an employer's policy cannot produce a forfeiture
of earned vacation pay." 2 Practically, this bill codifies the majority view of
Louisiana's appellate courts which have ruled that "vacation pay" is equivalent
to "wages" under the statute. 83
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1997 session of the Louisiana Legislature was a "banner" year for
employment law. In one area, employment discrimination law, the legislature
sought to simplify and clarify the piecemeal legislation enacted over a twenty
year period. In another area, the legislature created a massive new area of
employment litigation for Louisiana-wrongful termination-by providing a
cause of action for whistleblowers in the workplace. For this, the authors of the
bills and the legislators who voted for their passage should be commended.
In reality, however, Louisiana's Employment Discrimination Law still needs
work to simplify and clarify its provisions. Specifically, the fate of the Human
Rights Commission should be finally determined-is it a bona fide "deferral
agency" with funding sufficient to allow it to perform its statutory functions or
should it be abolished? The law should also be streamlined and simplified with
respect to the employer coverage, retaliation and available remedies, as suggested
above.
In addition, for our employment discrimination laws to have relevance apart
from the plaintiff's desires to have an exclusive state forum in which to litigate,
the legislature should act to bring different perspectives to the law than those
contained in the federal anti-discrimination laws. The "me too" approach courts
have used in construing Louisiana's laws by adopting federal case law .even in
the presence of differing statutory language also must stop. Louisiana could be
a model for the rest of the country in using alternative dispute resolution to
efficiently resolve these disputes. To sum up, the legislature has wrought the
first step in pushing Sissyphus' rock up the hill-its up to the rest of us to
encourage it to keep pushing.
181. La. R.S. 23:631(D)(I)(a), (b) (1998).
182. La. R.S. 23:631(D)(2) (1998).
183. See, e.g., Barrileaux v. Franklin Found. Hosp., 683 So. 2d 348 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996),
writ denied, 686 So. 2d 864 (1997); Macrellis v. Southwest Louisiana Independence Ctr., 657 So.
2d 135 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995); Berteau v. Weiner, 362 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ
denied, 365 So. 2d 242 (1979). However, the Fifth Circuit continued to allow an employer to
withhold earned, but unused vacation pay. See Huddleston v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 638 So. 2d 383
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Howser v. Carruth Mortgage Corp., 476 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 5th Cit.
1985).
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